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STATE ME NT OF THE CASE 
This is Defendant/Respondent/Cross-Appellant City of McCall's (the "City") reply brief 
in support of its cross-appeal of the district court's decision denying the City's request for 
attorney fees. This brief responds to Appellants/Cross-Respondents' Reply Brief(hereinafter 
"Greystone 's Reply Brief") filed by Appellants Richard Hehr and Greystone Village, LLC 
(collectively, "Grey stone") on June 15, 2012, and refers also to Appellants' Brief (hereinafter 
"Greystone 's Opening Brief') filed on April25, 2012. The City's Response Brief on its cross-
appeal was included as part of Respondent/Cross-Appellant's Brief("City's Response Brief") 
filed on May 18,2012. 
Greystone contends that the City's cross-appeal should be denied because, even though 
its case was dismissed, it did not pursue its claims frivolously or unreasonably. Greystone 's 
Reply Brief at 19. Further, Greystone asserts (without explanation) that the City did not provide 
adequate support for the amount of fees claimed below. Greystone 's Reply Brief at 19-20. We 
will briefly discuss each in turn. The discussion concerning the City's entitlement to fees under 
Idaho Code § 12-117 will necessarily touch on some of the legal issues raised in the parties' 
other briefs in this appeal, because the standard for an award of fees under that statute is whether 
"the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." 
ARGUMENT 
I. THERE IS NO DISPUTE AS TO THE STANDARDS GOVERNING ATTORNEY FEE 
AWARDS. 
As discussed in prior briefing, City's Response Brief at 45-46, recent cases have held that 
if Idaho Code § 12-117 is available, it is exclusive. Idaho Code § 12-121 will come into play 
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only if, for some reason, the Court determines that section 12-11 7 is unavailable. In any event, 
this Court has equated the standards under these two provisions. Under either provision, the 
applicable standard boils down to a requirement that Greystone's pursuit of the litigation be 
frivolous. It was, and it remains frivolous. 
II. GREYSTONE'S POSITION ON RESOLUTION 08-11 AND THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT 
IS UNREASONABLE. 
Greystone claims that "there is an issue of first impression whether a municipality creates 
a new claim and a new notice period under the ITCA by resolution." Greystone 's Reply Brief at 
19. This claim is without a reasonable foundation in both fact and law. 
First, the undisputed facts show that the City did not adopt any resolution that entitled 
Greystone to a "refund." Resolution 08-11, upon which Greystone relies for this claim, only 
provided for refunds of fees paid under Ordinance 820. The record reflects that Greystone paid 
no such fees. Those fees were waived. Greystone may wish that the City had adopted a 
resolution providing compensation for persons whose fees were waived, but there was no such 
resolution. As a result, Resolution 08-11 does not apply to Greystone and could not have created 
a new claim for Greystone. 
Greystone does not offer a single citation to authority to support its position that 
Resolution 08-11 created a new claim and a new notice period. See Greystone 's Opening Brief 
at 31 and Greys tone's Reply Brief at 3-4. i~~ party cannot be deemed to have created a genuine 
"issue of first impression" when Idaho law is clear and there is no legal theory or authority that 
even remotely supports that party's argument. 
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Moreover, Greystone fails to explain how the adoption of Resolution 08-11 on April 24, 
2008 helps it meet the 180-day deadline set by the Idaho Tort Claim Act ("ITCA"), Idaho Code 
§ 6-906, together with Idaho Code§ 50-219. Even if that resolution applied to Greystone and 
created a new cause of action that re-started the 180-day clock, Greystone missed the new 
deadline, too. Greystone did not submit anything remotely resembling a notice under the ITCA 
until its Refund Request Form was submitted on November 25, 2009-considerably more than 
180 days later. 
The lack of merit in Greystone's claim on this issue is further reflected in Greystone 's 
Reply Brief at 3. Greystone calls the City's argument that Greystone did not pay any fees under 
Ordinance 820 "nothing short of silly." But Greystone's own statements in its Refund Request 
Form demonstrate that Greystone recognized that it had paid no such fees. Greystone's refund 
request clearly related solely to the original conveyance of the lots to the City. Its refund request 
contains no claim for fees waived by the City: "Nine single family lots had to be given to the 
City of McCall in order to get approval and entitlements for Greystone Village. This was not 
voluntary on my part. Appraised value at the time was $1,340,000.00." Groenevelt Aff, Exh. Y. 
Greystone's claim that Resolution 08-11 applied to it and created a new notice period is 
without factual or legal foundation. Instead, it is a transparent, desperate, and frivolous attempt 
to avoid the statutory notice requirement. Pursuing its state claims in the face ofthis obvious 
jurisdictional bar can only be described as frivolous. 
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Although it did not pursue its quasi-estoppel theory on appeal, 1 Greystone's pursuit of 
that baseless defense at the district court also reinforces the justification for an award of attorney 
fees. 
III. GREYSTONE'S POSITION ON THE FOUR-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS LACKS A 
REASONABLE BASIS IN LAW. 
The district court also held that the Greystone' s state law claims were barred by the four-
year statute of limitations. Greystone's argument in support ofthe district court's decision to 
deny the City's request for fees is that the district court "misapplied the accrual standard for 
Greystone's takings claims .... " Greystone 's Reply Brief at 19. In fact, the district court 
applied this Court's precedent correctly, while Greystone ignored or misconstrued it. Failure to 
address controlling appellate decisions and failure to address factual or legal findings ofthe 
district court equates to pursuing litigation without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Waller v. 
State o.f Idaho, Dep 't of Health and Welfare, 146 Idaho 234, 240, 192 P.3d 1058, 1064 (2008). 
First, Greystone persists in contending that its claim based upon the contribution of the 
lots to the City did not accrue until it actually deeded the lots to the City rather than, as found by 
the district court, the date upon which the Development Agreement was signed. The language 
used by the district court amply demonstrates that Greystone ignored settled precedent on this 
ISSue: 
1 Greystone initially framed its ITCA defense under the rubric of quasi-estoppel. R. Vol. 
II, pp. 252-55. The district court readily disposed of this frivolous argument, relying on City of 
Eagle v. Idaho Dep 't of Water Resources, 150 Idaho 449, 247 P.3d 1037 (2011), among other 
authorities. R. Vol. II, p. 363-65. 
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• "The Development Agreement clearly sets forth that the agreement expressly and 
unequivocally mandated the conveyance of the nine lots when it contained 
language 'Greystone Village shall deed to the City of McCall nine affordable 
housing lots located along McCall A venue and shown on the plat for Greystone 
Village as Phase III."' R. Vol. II, p. 366. 
• "It was abundantly apparent to the Plaintiffs that they were, by the Development 
Agreement, transferring these lots to the City. [Citations omitted.]" !d. 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
• "It was clear that the Plaintiffs had an actionable claim even before the signing of 
the Development Agreement based upon the record before the Court." !d. 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
• "In this case, the Plaintiffs certainly knew what their damages were when they 
signed the Development Agreement on July 16, 2006." R. Vol. II, p. 367 
(emphasis supplied). 
Greystone's stubborn and unreasonable insistence that its claim did not accrue until it 
deeded the lots to the City, while also claiming to recognize the applicable test-that its inverse 
condemnation claim accrued "as of the time that the full extent of the plaintiff's loss of use and 
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enjoyment of the property becomes apparent"2-ignores that this Court has previously rejected 
the date of payment as being the date of accrual, where the impairment became apparent earlier. 
The clearest example ofthis is Harris v. State, ex ref. Kempthorne, 147 Idaho 401,210 
P .3d 86 (2009), in which this Court ruled that the statute of limitations on inverse condemnation 
ran from the day the plaintiffs were compelled to enter into a mineral lease with the State, not the 
time they made payments to the State under the lease. "We affirm the district court's 
determination that the full extent of the Harrises' loss ofuse and enjoyment ofthe property 
became apparent when they entered into the Mineral Lease. At that point in time, the 
impairment constituted a substantial interference with their property interest because they signed 
an agreement promising to pay royalties and rents on the sand and gravel. Therefore, the 
Harrises are barred from recovering under their inverse condemnation claim by I.C. § 5-224." 
Harris, 147ldaho at 405,210 P.3d at 90 (emphasis supplied). 
Greystone has never provided any applicable authority or cogent argument in response to 
the holding in Harris that the statute of limitations runs from the date of the execution of the 
agreement that imposes the obligation rather than from the date of the payment made pursuant to 
the agreement. The district court's statement that "[t]his case presented a number of challenging 
legal issues regarding which statute of limitations applied, when the cause of action accrued, and 
whether the Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their remedies as set out in the case of KMST, LLC v. 
2 McCuskey v. Canyon City Comm 'rs ("McCuskey II"), 128 Idaho 213, 217, 912 P.2d 
100, 104 (1996) (quoting Intermountain West, Inc. v. Boise City, 111 Idaho 878, 880, 728 P.2d 
767, 769 (1986) and citing Tibbs v. City of Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667, 671, 603 P.2d 1001, 1005 
(1979)) (emphasis supplied)). 
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County of Ada, 138 Idaho 577 (2003)" contradicts its statements set forth above concerning the 
accrual date. 
Greystone's second basis for challenging the district court's decision on the statute of 
limitations is equally unreasonable. Greystone argues that the Court should extend the reasoning 
underlying the project completion rule from C&G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway Dist. No. 4, 139 
Idaho 140, 75 P.3d 194 (2003) to its claim. However, the bases for this Court's adoption ofthe 
project completion rule have no application here-a fact that was recognized by the district court 
and which is not addressed by Greystone. In C&G, the Court found that the project completion 
rule was the proper standard in construction project cases because the landowner should not be 
required to prematurely bring a claim before damages can be assessed, which would risk 
piecemeal litigation and the risk of res judicata. 139 Idaho at 144, 75 P.3d 194, 198. Here, as 
observed by the district court, Greystone knew what its alleged damages were when it signed the 
Development Agreement-indeed, well before that. R. Vol. II, p. 367. Greystone fails to 
explain how setting the date for accrual at the time of the conveyance of the lots rather than the 
execution of the Development Agreement (or earlier-when Greystone became aware that it 
would be expected to provide community housing) is contrary to the goals of promoting judicial 
economy and creating certainty. The C&G Court expressly limited the project completion rule 
to construction projects and affirmed that the Tibbs standard continued to apply to all other 
inverse condemnation claims. 139 Idaho at 144, 75 P.3d 194, 198. Applying the Tibbs standard 
to this type of claim is not difficult. Nor is it "inherently arbitrary" as described by Greystone. 
Greystone 's Reply Brief at 7. 
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The record supports the conclusion that Plaintiffs ignored settled precedent regarding the 
applicable statute of limitations and therefore unreasonably and frivolously pursued this 
litigation. 
IV. GREYSTONE'S PURSUIT OF ITS FEDERAL CLAIMS WAS FRIVOLOUS AS WELL. 
A. Williamson Counzyripeness 
As stated by the district court, Greystone did not object to the Development Agreement, 
which means that there was no final decision under the first prong of Williamson County 
Regional Planning Comm 'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). The 
requirement to obtain a final decision from the government concerning a development 
application was clear before Greystone ever filed suit. While Williamson County dealt with a 
party's failure to seek a variance, the rule plainly applies here to require Greystone to obtain a 
final decision concerning whether the City would have approved its applications without any 
community housing provision. 
Throughout this proceeding and even in its reply brief, Greystone fails to grapple with 
this precedent and all the cases that have followed. Greystone says, "The Framers did not state 
in the Fifth Amendment that just compensation for the taking of property must be paid so long as 
the property owner first objects to the taking." Greystone 's Reply Brief at 15. The Framers may 
not have said it, but this Court did. In KN!ST, LLC v. County of Ada, 138 Idaho 577, 67 P.3d 56 
(2003), the Court recognized that a foundational premise of any taking claim is that the 
plaintiffs action not be voluntary. Greystone's failure to raise any objection or even inquiry as 
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to whether the donation of the lots was a prerequisite of develpment approval renders the case 
unripe under Williamson County. 
Greystone also frivolously brushes aside precedent under prong two of Williamson 
County. In all its briefing to this Court, Greystone does not even mention Pascoag Reservoir & 
Dam, LLC v. Rhode Island, 337 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2003), which established that failure to bring a 
timely state inverse condemnation claim in state court results in forfeiture of the federal claim 
(because the federal claim can never be ripened). See City's Response Brief at 43-44. 
B. Two-year statute of limitations 
Even ifGreystone's claim were ripe under Williamson County, Greystone's pursuit of its 
federal claims is patently and inexcusably tardy under the applicable two-year statute of 
limitations. (For that matter, it is tardy even under a four-year statute of limitations, but the error 
is all the more egregious given the two-year statute.) 
As the Ninth Circuit said: "Thus, ... Hacienda's claim ... will either fail because it is 
not ripe, or, if it is ripe, it will be barred by the statute of limitations." Hacienda Valley Mobile 
Estates v. City of Morgan Hill, 353 F.3d 651,655 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1041 
(2004 and 2005) (two petitions for certiorari denied) (citing Levald, Inc. v. City ofPalm Desert, 
998 F.2d 680, 688 (9th Cir. 1993)). The same is true here. There may be room for discussion as 
to which hurdle would trip up its case. But there was simply no way that Greystone could 
overcome all of the hurdles to its federal claims. 
It does not matter a great deal whether the two-year or four-year statute of limitations 
applies, because Greystone met neither. Yet Greystone continues to insist that it can bring its 
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federal claim directly under the federal Constitution (notwithstanding Azul-Pacifica, Inc. v. City 
of Los Angeles, 973 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1081 (1993) and all the 
cases subsequent) and that doing so means it can escape the two-year statute of limitations. 
This is a complete disconnect. Federal precedent controls here and federal courts have 
ruled consistently that the two-year statute of limitations applies whether the federal claim is 
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or directly under the Constitution. Bieneman v. City ofChicago, 
864 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1988) (direct takings claim subject to two-year statute) and Van Strum v. 
Lawn, 940 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying Bieneman in Ninth Circuit in non-takings case). 
Greystone blithely ignores this precedent and continues to make incredible statements like this: 
"In this case, the most analogous state statute for Greystone's Fifth Amendment federal inverse 
claim is the four ( 4) year statute of limitations found in Idaho Code section 5-224." Greys tone's 
Reply Brief at 5. 
V. GREYSTONE'S POSITION THAT ITS "ROAD AND UTILITY IMPROVEMENTS CLAIM" 
IS A SEPARATE CLAIM NOT SUBJECT TO THE SAME DEFENSES IS UNREASONABLE. 
The City has pointed out that its Motion for Summary Judgment covered all of 
Greystone's claims, and that Greystone's response never differentiated between the claims 
related to the conveyance of the lots and the improvements. City's Response Brief at 36. Indeed, 
references to the deeds and the improvements are combined throughout the First Amended 
Complaint (R. Vol. 1, pp. 6-1 0), supporting the conclusion that these are not separate claims at 
all. 
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In a desperate scramble to salvage some piece of its case through this "separate claim" 
theory, Greystone misrepresents the record. Greystone alleges that once the City became the 
owner of the lots, there was no expectation on Greystone's part that it was obligated to construct 
the public improvements for those lots. Greystone 's Reply Brief at 3. This assertion is made 
without citation to the record. In fact, it is utterly without support in any of the affidavits filed by 
Greystone in opposition to the City's A1otion for Summary Judgment. Further, it is flatly 
contradicted by the record in this action which shows that the construction of all roads and 
utilities was part of the application for the subdivision, regardless of who would end up owning 
any of the individual lots. See Groenevelt Aff., Exh. A, p. 5 (application listing anticipated 
improvements including streets, sewer, and drainage); McCall Subdivision Ordinance§§ 3-21-
250 to 3-21-260 (Exh. C to City's Response Brief). 
Greystone goes on to state that the obligation to construct improvements was not 
addressed in the Development Agreement. Greystone 's Reply Brief at 3. This, too, is false. 
Article III of the Development Agreement provides that "Greystone Village shall be responsible 
for 100% ofthe cost of construction ofthe Sewer Service Connections." Article IV states that 
"Greystone Village shall be responsible for 100% of the cost of construction of the Fire 
Hydrants." Article V describes the infrastructure that "[t]he applicant shall construct/provide" 
including "street, drainage, water, sewer, and landscaping improvements .... "3 Groenevelt Aff., 
Exh. R, pp. 1-2. 
3 Technically, Paragraph 5.1.4 only obligates Greystone to submit construction drawings 
for the improvements. But, Paragraph 5.2 states that "Greystone Village shall be constructed as 
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Perhaps most troubling are Greystone's representations that "the City's own staff 
questioned whether Greystone was responsible for building roads and running utilities to Jots it 
did not own" and that the requirement to construct infrastructure was a "later and separate act" 
by the City. Greystone 's Reply Brief at 3. These are both patently false. The email written by 
Michelle Groenevelt (Greystone's source for the first statement) clearly reflects that the inquiry 
concerning Greystone's responsibility for road improvements on McCall Avenue came from 
Richard Hehr, who was "trying to fill in the information gaps" because Steve Benad was no 
longer part of the project and Mr. Hehr had a new partner. Via the email, Ms. Groenevelt passed 
Mr. Hehr' s question on to former City Manager Roger Millar for his input. Ms. Groenevelt 
included her own conclusion which was that the phases of Greystone Village were considered a 
single project making the developer responsible for all of the improvements and that the 
"construction drawings/final plat show these improvements." R. Vol. II, p. 3 85. Mr. Millar 
confirmed Ms. Groenevelt's understanding: "Greystone Village subdivided property and then 
gave platted Jots to the City. Part of subdivision is providing infrastructure to the lots being 
created. The engineering plans reflect this. It was theirs to do when they planned on selling the 
Jots and still theirs to do with the donation." ld. These same statements also reflect that there 
shown on the plans attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit 'C' ." Groenevelt Aff., 
Exh. R, p 3. In addition, one of the City Council's findings supporting the approval of the 
Greystone Village final plan states: "The applicant shall submit construction drawings for street, 
snow storage, drainage, water, sewer, and landscaping improvements to the City with the final 
plat application. The City Engineer approved construction plans and final plat/plan for Phase I 
and II." Groenevelt Aff., Exh. Q, p. 7. The clear import of these provisions is that the developer 
was obligated to build the subdivision infrastructure. 
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was no "later and separate act" by the City related to the infrastructure. All such requirements 
were part of the approved subdivision. 
The district court was correct to dispose of this argument in a single paragraph on 
obvious grounds-that Plaintiffs did not set the infrastructure claims out separately in the First 
Amended Complaint and the City "specifically sought dismissal of all of Plaintiffs' claims in its 
Motion for Summary Judgment," meaning that the infrastructure "claims" were encompassed in 
its prior ruling granting summary judgment to the City. Greystone's arguments regarding its 
infrastructure claims are without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
VI. GREYSTONE'S POSITION REGARDING THE VOLUNT ARINESS OF THE 
CONVEYANCE OF THE LOTS IS UNREASONABLE. 
Greystone seeks to avoid an award of fees by insisting that the record shows a material 
factual dispute as to whether its contribution of the lots for community housing was voluntary. 
To this end, Greystone harps on the affidavits from Mr. Hehr and his agents that state, many 
years later, that they perceived the contribution to be mandatory despite the fact that Ordinance 
819 did not apply to them. It is not necessary to evaluate whether such statements are credible. 
Even if these after-the-fact mental impressions were accurate, they cannot overcome undisputed 
facts in the record meeting the objective legal test for voluntariness under KMST, LLC v. County 
of Ada, 138 Idaho 577, 67 P.3d 56 (2003). 
It is undisputed that Ordinance 819 did not apply to Greystone and that no ordinance 
compelled Greystone to convey the Jots. R. Vol. II, p. 368. It is also undisputed that Greystone 
signed a Development Agreement under which it agreed to convey property valued at over a 
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million dollars to the City, securing in exchange only an assurance that the City would waive any 
additional fees (which might have amounted to a few thousand dollars) under Ordinance 820. 
The City's findings and conclusions approving Greystone's applications consistently and 
repeatedly recite that Greystone was not required to provide a Community Housing Plan. 
Groenevelt Aff., Exhs. P and Q; see also Statement ofFacts in City's Response Briefat 9-12. 
These are matters of public record, which Greystone never sought to correct. Instead, the 
developers stood for pictures with the Mayor and accepted the praise of the City and the media 
for their contribution. Groenevelt Aff, Exh. T. 
At best, there is a factual dispute concerning whether the original proposal for Greystone 
to contribute toward community housing originated with Greystone or was suggested by the 
City. But this does not matter. Either way, the fact is that Greystone chose to sign the agreement 
without reservation or objection. This makes it voluntary within the meaning of KMST and 
makes Greystone' s prosecution of this action unreasonable. 
VII. IN ADDITION, GREYSTONE FAILED TO SEEK JUDICIAL REVIEW. 
On appeal, the City has emphasized another basis for dismissing Greystone' s case-its 
failure to seek judicial review under the Local Land Use Planning Act ("LLUPA"). City's 
Response Brief at 13-14. Although this issue was presented only glancingly below-it is, of 
course, a jurisdictional issue that may be raised at any time-it only adds to the list of reasons 
that Greystone's case was a non-starter. 
For example, Greystone's contention in Greystone 's Reply Brief at 9 (that "[t]he takings 
claims raised by Greystone in this lawsuit likewise have nothing to do with a 'permit' under 
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LLUPA") is frivolous. The requirements to deed lots and construct infrastructure that Greystone 
alleges are illegal were imposed pursuant to approval of a subdivision and a planned unit 
development, which are appealable actions under LLUPA. Terrazas v. Blaine City ex rel. Bd. of 
Comm 'rs, 147 Idaho 193, 197, 207 P.3d 169, 173 (2009) ("The decision regarding a subdivision 
application is a decision granting a permit, I.C. § 67-6513, and is therefore subject to judicial 
review.") (citing Johnson v. Blaine City, 146 Idaho 916,920-21,204 P.3d 1127, 1131-32 
(2009) ); Noble v. Kootenai City, 148 Idaho 93 7, 940, 231 P .3d 1034, 103 7 (20 1 0) (citing 
Terrazas). Greystone ignores this settled precedent and fails to grapple with the obvious fact that 
its planned unit development and subdivision approvals were appealable. Obviously an 
applicant may appeal not only denial of a permit but granting of a permit with unacceptable 
conditions. Idaho Code § 67 -6519( 4) (permit appealable if "applicant denied a permit or 
aggrieved by a decision").4 
Greystone's citation (Greystone 's Reply Brief at 8) to Idaho Code§ 67-6521(2)(b) is 
specious as well. Again, Greystone ignores precedent. Specifically, it ignores this Court's 
explanation of that provision, which shows that it does not apply to all regulatory takings actions. 
Rather, as this Court has said, "[i]t only applies if the basis of the inverse condemnation claim is 
that a specific zoning action or permitting action restricting private property development is 
actually a regulatory action by local government deemed necessary to complete the development 
of the material resources of the state, or necessary for other public uses." K}vfST, LLC v. County 
4 This is from the statute prior to the 2010 amendment to LLUPA. House Bill 605,2010 
Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 175, effective March 31, 2010. The same result obtains after the 2010 
RESPO~DE~T/CROSS-APPELLA~T'S REPLY BRIEF 0~ CROSS-APPEAL Page 19 of22 
1509630 _9_ 4432-9 
of Ada, 138 Idaho 577, 583, 67 P.3d 56, 62 (2003) (internal quotations omitted).5 This is a 
regulatory takings case, not an eminent domain case in which the plaintiff alleges that the 
government action is not for a public purpose. 
In sum, Greystone's ineffective defense of its failure to appeal under LLUPA is yet 
another example of its frivolous pursuit of this case. 
VIII. THE CITY ADEQUATELY SUPPORTED ITS REQUEST FOR FEES BELOW. 
Greystone complains that the City did not establish that it was entitled to the amount of 
fees that it incurred below. Greystone 's Reply Brief at 20, citing R. Vol. IV, pp. 608-613 
(objecting to the amount of fees requested on the basis that counsel's rates exceeded the 
prevailing rates in Valley County.) The City supported its request for attorney fees with an 
affidavit from William Nichols, who has been the city attorney for McCall since 2005. 
Mr. Nichols testified in his affidavit that it was necessary to look outside of Valley County to 
obtain counsel for the City in this matter due to the subject matter and the existence of conflicts 
of interest with local attorneys. R. Vol. III., p. 444. Such testimony is sufficient to establish that 
it was reasonable for the City to look to Boise for counsel and that Boise is therefore the proper 
amendment. 
5 The exemption in 67-6521(2)(b) is expressly tied to the constitutional provision on 
eminent domain, Idaho Const., art. I,§ 14, which authorizes condemnation of property for any 
"use necessary to the complete development of the material resources of the state," which uses 
are "declared to be a public use." This sweeping condemnation power-which may be exercised 
not only by the government but by private parties-has been recognized since 1906. Potlatch 
Lumber Co. v. Peterson, 12 Idaho 769, 88 P. 426 (1906); Blackwell Lumber Co. v. Empire Mill 
Co., 28 Idaho 556, 155 P. 680 (1916), appeal dismissed, 244 U.S. 651. Section 67-6521(2)(b) is 
aimed at facilitating challenges to takings that are alleged not to be for a legitimate public use, as 
in the famous case of Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
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geographical area for consideration of prevailing rates. Lettunich v. Lettunich, 145 Idaho 7 46, 
750-51, 185 P.3d 258, 262-63 (2008). 6 
While the City is confident that the entire amount of fees incurred below is reasonable 
and adequately supported, this issue appears to be premature. If the City prevails on its cross 
appeal, then a determination of the amount of fees to be awarded at the trial court level would 
need to be addressed by the trial court on remand. (Likewise, if the Court awards fees on appeal, 
the amount of such fees will be determined pursuant to I.A.R. 41.) 
CONCLUSION 
In order to show its entitlement to attorney fees, it is not necessary for the City to prevail 
on each and every one of its defenses. It need only prevail on one defense for each claim. 
Consequently, in order to have a non-frivolous lawsuit, Greystone must have at least a plausible 
and reasonable argument on every defense raised by the City. The fact that Greystone "might 
win" on one or two of the City's defenses does not justify Greystone in putting the City through 
this expensive litigation. Even if Greystone were to pass one hurdle or another (or come close to 
doing so), it is clear that Greystone could not overcome all of them. Any reasonable analysis 
would lead to the inescapable conclusion that Greystone's claims faced insurmountable 
obstacles. Accordingly, Greystone's pursuit of this lawsuit was frivolous, and the Court should 
reverse the district court's denial ofthe City's request for attorney fees. 
6 It is significant to note that before the trial court, Greystone only cited to the first 
Lettunich decision (141 Idaho 425, 111 P.3d 110) and did not even bother to mention this 
Court's follow up in Lettunich II, which seems to be directly applicable. 
RESPO~DE:\T/CROSS-APPELLA~T'S REPLY BRIEF 0.1'1 CROSS-APPEAL 
1509630 _9, 4432-9 
Page 21 of22 
Respectfully submitted this 6th day of July, 2012. 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
By 
By 
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